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Abstract 
We reconsider the “excess entry theorem” in the case of a network product market. 
Heterogeneous consumers, who are sensitive to network effects, have passive expectations and 
Cournot oligopolistic competition prevails in the market. We demonstrate that if the network 
effect elasticity of network size in the equilibrium is sufficiently large, the number of firms under 
free entry is socially insufficient, compared with the second-best criteria. Otherwise, the socially 
excessive entry arises. Furthermore, we examine the case of responsive expectations and of 
network effect-insensitive consumers. 
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1．Introduction 
 
As in the review by Suzumura (2012), the “excess entry theorem” casts serious doubt on the 
conventional wisdom that the relative efficiency of resource allocation increases monotonically 
as the number of firms expands, that is, an increase in the number of firms promotes market 
competition and consequently improves social welfare. Since the seminal papers of Mankiw and 
Whinston (1986) and Suzumura and Kiyono (1987), there have many studies extending the 
theorem to various contexts: spatial competition, vertically related market structure, horizontally 
differentiated products markets, technology licensing, and network effects (see Matsumura and 
Okamura, 2006; Mukherjee and Mukherjee, 2008; Kagitani et al., 2016; Basak and Mukherjee, 
2016; and Toshimitsu, 2020). 
As digital technology progresses, we have observed the remarkable growth of information 
and communications technology (ICT) industries, e.g., telecommunications, Internet business, 
and social network services. Currently, many global companies are entering to the industries in 
newly industrializing countries such as China and Korea as well as in advanced countries such as 
the US and those in the EU. Thus, it is an important problem to examine how new entrants into 
such network product and service markets affect social efficiency. Toshimitsu (2020) introduced 
network effects into a standard quadratic utility function, a model that is closely related to ours, 
considered the social efficiency of a network product market, and demonstrated that if the degree 
of network effects is sufficiently large, the number of firms under free entry is socially 
insufficient, based on the second-best criteria. Toshimitsu (2020) assumed that homogeneous 
consumers have utility function with the same preferences regarding network effects. In particular, 
the marginal utility increase caused by an increase in network effects does not depend on the 
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consumer’s preference (type), i.e., consumers are insensitive to network effects. However, in this 
paper, we assume that consumers who are sensitive to network effects (hereafter, CSNEs) exist in 
a network product market and have different preferences regarding network effects. This 
assumption is similar to that of Rohlfs (1974) and Lambertini and Orsini (2004), who consider 
direct network effects in a telecommunications industry. As shown below, the marginal utility 
increase caused by an increase in network effects depends on the consumer’s type. 
The purpose of the paper is to reconsider the “excess entry theorem” in the presence of 
CSNEs. In Section 2, we show that whether the number of firms under free entry is socially 
insufficient or excessive depends on the elasticity of network effects with respect to network size 
in the equilibrium. In Section 3, we also investigate the case of responsive expectations to 
confirm the result. Following Toshimitsu (2020), we examine the case of consumers who are 
insensitive to network effects (hereafter, CINEs). In addition, as future research problems, we 
consider the properties of network function and consumer expectations. 
 
 
2．The Model: The Presence of CSNEs 
 
2.1 An inverse demand function with multiplicatively added network effects 
To analyze the excess entry theorem in the case of Cournot oligopolistic competition associated 
with network effects, we assume the presence of a direct network effect as already observed in 
ICT industries. In particular, we consider a linear market city where there is a continuum of 
consumers, indexed ].1,0[∈θ  To simplify, we assume that consumers are uniformly distributed 
with a density of one in the market, and the utility function (willingness-to-pay) of consumer θ  
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is given by: ( ) ( ) ,eu N Xθ θ=  where ( )eN X  is an increasing network function of expected 
network sizes, .eX 1  
Given the price, a consumer purchases at most either one unit of the product or none. Hence, 
the surplus of consumer θ  is expressed as: ( ) ( ){ }max ,0 .v u Pθ θ= −  The index of the 
marginal consumer who has the same surplus from purchasing either one unit of the product or 
none is ˆ .
( )e
P
N X
θ =  The quantity demanded of the network product in the market is given by: 
ˆ1 ,X θ= −  [0,1].X ∈  We obtain the following inverse demand function: 
( )( )1eP N X X= − , 
1
,
n
i
i
X x
=
=∑                                       (1) 
where ix  is the output of firm i. We assume that production costs are zero. For example, 
marginal costs of production in network product industries are either negligible or zero. Thus, 
firm i’s profit function is expressed as: 
( )( )1 ,ei i iPx f N X X x fπ = − = − −                                   (2) 
where f  is a fixed entry cost. 
We should notice consumer expectations that in general play an important role in a market 
with network effects. Based on the definition of Hurkens and López (2014), we examine the case 
of passive and responsive expectations: passive expectations imply that consumers first form 
expectations of network sizes and then firms compete in quantities, given the expected network 
sizes. Finally, consumers make optimal purchasing decisions, given their expectations. The 
                                                   
1  We assume that a network function and an expected network size are symmetrical: 
( ) ( )e eN X N Xθ θ =  for [0,1],θ ∈  where e eX Xθ =  is the expected network size of consumer 
.θ  Furthermore, it holds that ( ) 0.
( )e
u
N X
θ θ∂ = >
∂
 That is, the larger is the value of θ , the higher 
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decisions then lead to the determination of actual market shares and network sizes. Thus, in the 
equilibrium, the realized and expected network sizes are the same (see Katz and Shapiro, 1985). 
Responsive expectations imply that firms first compete in quantities and then consumers form 
expectations of network sizes. Finally, consumers make optimal purchasing decisions, given the 
quantities and their expectations. We will examine the case of responsive expectations in Section 
3. 
 
2.2 A fulfilled Cournot equilibrium under passive expectations 
Using equations (1) and (2), the first-order condition (FOC) of profit maximization of firm i is 
given by: 
( )( ) ( ) 1 2 0,e ei i i i
i
P N X x N X x X
x
π
−
∂
= − = − − =
∂
                         (3) 
where 
1,
.
n
i i
i i i
X x− −
− = − ≠
= ∑  Furthermore, the second-order condition (SOC) and the cross effect are: 
2
2 2 ( ) 0
ei
i
N X
x
π∂
= − <
∂
 and 
2
( ) 0.ei
i i
N X
x X
π
−
∂
= − <
∂ ∂
 The latter implies that strategic substitutes 
arise. 
At the symmetric fulfilled equilibrium, i.e., eX X=  and ,ix x=  based on the FOC, we 
derive the following individual and total outputs:2 
                                                                                                                                                                    
is the marginal utility of network effects. 
2  The equilibrium outputs depend only on the number of firms. This is because of the 
specification of the model, e.g., a stand-alone benefit does not exist and the marginal cost of 
production is zero. However, even relaxing the specification, the results do not significantly 
change. Even so, according to some values of stand-alone benefit and marginal cost, the corner 
solution, i.e., 1pX =  and 1 ,px
n
=  is possible. In this paper, we do not consider the corner 
solution. 
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1
1
px
n
=
+
 and ,
1
p nX
n
=
+
                                        (4) 
where superscript p denotes the case of passive expectations. We derive the following effects of 
an increase in the number of firms on the outputs: 
1
p pdx x
dn n
= −
+
 and .
1
p p p
pdX dx xx n
dn dn n
= + =
+
                         (5) 
Thus, it holds that .
p pdx dX
dn dn
= −  
 
2.3 Is free entry socially excessive? 
Before examining the excess entry theorem, we define the number of firms under free entry, 
given the zero profit condition, i.e., 0,pπ =  as follows: { }2 0p p pn n P x f∈ ≥ − =  where 
( )( )1p p pP N X X= −  and .
p
p Xx
n
=  
The social welfare function based on the second-best criteria is given by: 
( )
0
( ) ( ), ,
pXp pW n P N X Z dZ nf= −∫                                    (6) 
where ( )( ), ( )(1 )p pP N X Z N X Z= −  and ( ) ( ).p pX n nx n=  Given equation (6), the second-best 
number of firms is given by: 
( )
0
( ) 1
( ) 1 0.
2
pp p pXp
p p p p
p p
p
W X N XP Z dZ f
n n n
X N X X XP X f
n X n
∂ ∂ ∂
= + − −
∂ ∂ ∂
 ∂ ∂ ∂
= + − − = ∂ ∂ ∂  
∫
                         (7) 
Thus, the socially second-best number of firms can be defined as: 
* ( )2 1 0 .
2
p p p p
p p p
p
X N X X Xn n P X f
n X n
  ∂ ∂ ∂ ∈ ≥ + − − =  ∂ ∂ ∂   
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   We consider the excess entry theorem in the presence of CSNEs. Evaluating equation (7) at 
the number of firms under free entry, we obtain: 
( ) 1 .
2p p
p p p p p
p p p
p
P x f
W X N X X XP x X
n n X n
=
   ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
= − + −   ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂   
                (8) 
In view of equation (8), following the terminology of Mankiw and Whinston (1986), the first 
term expresses a “business-stealing” effect of intense market competition, which reduces social 
welfare, and the second term expresses a “business-augmenting” effect by network effects that 
improve social welfare. Using the FOC, i.e., ( ) ,p p pP N X x=  and ,
p pdx dX
dn dn
= −  equation (8) 
is rewritten as: 
( ) 1
2
( )( ) 1
2
( )( ) 1 .
( ) 2
p p
p p p p p
p p
p
P x f
p p p p
p p p
p
p p p p
p p
p p
W x N X X XP n X
n n X n
X N X X XN X X X
n X n
X N X X XN X X
n X N X
=
 ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
= + − ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  
 ∂ ∂ ∂
= − + − ∂ ∂ ∂  
  ∂ ∂ = − + −  ∂ ∂   
                       (9) 
Because ( ) 0,
p
p XN X
n
∂
>
∂
 we derive the following relationship: 
( )0 ( ) 1 ( )0,
2p p
p p
p p
P x f
W XX X
n
ε
=
 ∂
> < ⇔ − + − > < ∂  
                    (10) 
where ( )( )
( )
p p
p
p p
N X XX
X N X
ε ∂≡
∂
 denotes the network effect elasticity of network size in a free 
entry equilibrium. On the right-side hand of equation (10), pX−  expresses the negative 
business-stealing effect and ( ) 1
2
p
p XXε
 
− 
 
 is the positive business-augmenting effect. Thus, 
when the former effect is larger (smaller) than the latter, social welfare decreases (increases) with 
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an increase in the number of firms, compared with the second-best criteria. Equation (10) is also 
rewritten as: 
2( )0 ( ) ( ) .
11
2
p p
p p p
p
p p
P x f
W X nX
Xn n
ε
=
∂
> < ⇔ > < =
∂ +−
                     (11) 
where 21 2.
1
p
p
n
n
< <
+
 We summarize the above result in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 
If the network effect elasticity of network size in a free entry equilibrium is sufficiently large 
(small), the number of firms under free entry is insufficient (excessive), based on the second-best 
criteria. 
 
 
3. Discussion 
 
In this section, we reexamine the proposition in the case of CSNEs with passive expectations, 
with respect to the following; (i) the case of responsive expectations; and (ii) the case of 
consumers who are insensitive to network effects (CINEs) 
 
3.1 Responsive expectations case 
Under responsive expectations, with regard to the perceived inverse demand function with 
network effects, it holds that .eX X=  Thus, equation (1) is revised as: 
( )( )1P N X X= − , 
1
.
n
i
i
X x
=
=∑                                       (12) 
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In view of equation (12), we derive the following first-order property of the inverse demand 
function. 
( )( ) ( ) 11 ( ) ( ) ( )
1
P X N X X XX N X N X X
X X X X
ε∂ ∂ −  = − − = − 
∂ ∂ − 
 
where ( )( )
( )
N X XX
X N X
ε ∂≡
∂
 is a network effect elasticity of total output (network size) in the 
case of responsive expectations. We assume that ( ) 0 ( ).
1
P X X X
X X
ε∂ < ⇔ >
∂ −
 The price 
elasticity of total output is given by: ( ) ( ) 0.
( ) 1
P X X X X
X P X X
ε∂− = − >
∂ −
 Furthermore, with 
respect to the second-order property, we have 
2
2
( ) ( ) 1 2( )
1
P X N X X XX
X X X X
∂ ∂ −  = Ε − 
∂ ∂ − 
 where 
2
2
( )( ) .( )
N X XX N XX
X
∂
Ε ≡
∂∂
∂
 
   The profit function of firm i is given by: ( )( )1 .i i iPx f N X X x fπ = − = − −  The FOC is 
( ) ( )( ) 1 2 1 0,i i i i i
i
P NP x N X x X X x
x X X
π
−
∂ ∂ ∂
= + = − − + − =
∂ ∂ ∂
                (13) 
We assume that the following SOC and cross effect hold: 
2 2
2 2
2
2
2
( ) 1 ( ) ( ) 12 ( ) 1 2( )( )
1 ( ) 22 ( ) ( ) ( ) 0
1 1
i
i
i
i
i
P P x
x X X
N X X X N X N X X XN X xN XX N X X X X X
X
X X N X XN X X X x
X X X X
π
ε
∂ ∂ ∂
= +
∂ ∂ ∂
 
  ∂ − ∂ ∂ −
= − + −   ∂∂ ∂ ∂   
∂ 
−  ∂    = − − + −Ε <    − ∂ −    
 
and 
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2 2
2
1 ( ) 2( ) ( ) ( ) 0.
1 1
i
i
i i
i
P P x
x X X X
X X N X XN X X X x
X X X X
π
ε
−
∂ ∂ ∂
= +
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
−  ∂    = − − + −Ε <    − ∂ −    
 
Thus, because the cross effect is negative, we have the following inequation: 
( ) 2( ) ( ) ( ) 0.
1 1 i
X N X XN X X X x
X X X
ε ∂   − + −Ε >   
− ∂ −   
                 (14) 
In the symmetric equilibrium, i.e., ,ix x=  from the FOC, we derive as follows: 
( )1 ( )( ) 1 1 1 0.
r
r r r rXN XN X X X
n X n
  ∂ − + + − =   ∂  
                      (15) 
where r rX nx=  and superscript r denote the case of responsive expectations. Taking the 
first-order property of the inverse demand function and equation (14), we obtain the effects of an 
increase in the number of firms on the total and individual outputs in the equilibrium as follows: 
1 0
rdX
dn n
Γ = >  ∆ 
 and 0,
r r rdx dX Xn
dn dn n
Γ
= − = − <
∆
 
where ( ) ( ) 0
1
r r
r r
r
X XN X X
X n
ε
 
Γ ≡ − > 
− 
 and  
1 ( ) 21 ( ) ( ) ( ) 0.
1 1
r r r r
r r r
r r r
X N X X XN X X X
n X X X n
ε
   ∂ ∆ ≡ + − + −Ε >     − ∂ −     
 
Before examining the excess entry theorem, we define the number of firms under free entry, 
given the zero profit condition, i.e., 0,rπ =  as follows: { }2 0r r rn n P x f∈ ≥ − =  where 
( )( )1r r rP N X X= −  and .
r
r Xx
n
=  
The social welfare function based on the second-best criteria is given by: 
( )
0
( ) ( ), ,
rXrW n P N Z Z dZ nf= −∫                                     (16) 
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where ( )( ), ( )(1 )P N Z Z N Z Z= −  and ( ) ( ).r rX n nx n=  The second-best number of firms is 
given by: 
0.
r r
pW X P f
n n
∂ ∂
= − =
∂ ∂
                                           (17) 
Thus, the socially second-best number of firms is defined as: * 2 0 .
r
r rXn n P f
n
 ∂
∈ ≥ − = 
∂ 
 
Evaluating equation (17) at the number of firms under free entry, we obtain: 
0.
r r
r r
r r r
P x f
r r r
r r
W X P P x
n n
X X xP P n
n n n
=
∂ ∂
= −
∂ ∂
 ∂ ∂
= − = < ∂ ∂ 
                                   (18) 
Therefore, irrespective of network effects, the number of firms under free entry is socially 
excessive, compared with the second-best number of firms. In the case of responsive expectations, 
there is no positive business-augmenting effect caused by network effects because, given the 
inversed demand included with network effects, firms decide their output. Thus, in the 
equilibrium, there is only a negative business-stealing effect, similar to the case of Cournot 
oligopolistic competition in a homogeneous product market. 
 
3.2 CINEs with passive expectations 
In the previous sections, assuming the utility function of CSNEs, we have derived the inverse 
demand function with multiplicative network effects, i.e., equations (1) and (12). In this section, 
we consider the utility function of consumers, who are insensitive to network effects (CINEs). In 
particular, all consumers have identical preferences for network effects, i.e., ( ) ( ).eu N Xθ θ= +  
Thus, the surplus of consumer θ  having passive expectations is given by: 
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( ) { }max ( ) ,0 .ev N X Pθ θ= + −  We obtain the following inverse demand function with additive 
separable network effects. 
( )1 eP X N X= − + , 
1
,
n
i
i
X x
=
=∑                                      (19) 
where we assume ( )1 0.
e
e
N X
X
∂
− + <
∂
 The profit function of firm i is expressed as: 
( ){ }1 .ei i iPx f X N X x fπ = − = − + −  The FOC is 1 2 ( ) 0.ei i i i
i
PP x x X N X
x X
π
−
∂ ∂
= + = − − + =
∂ ∂
 
Based on the FOC and by the same procedure as in the previous sections, we have the following 
equation determining total output in the symmetric fulfilled Cournot equilibrium under passive 
expectations. 
11 1 ( ) 0.p pX N X
n
 − + + = 
 
                                        (20) 
Thus, the effects of an increase in the number of firms on the total and individual outputs are as 
follows: 
1
0
1 ( )1
r
p
p
p
X
dX n n
N Xdn
n X
 
 
 = >
∂
+ −
∂
 and 
( )1
0.
1 ( )1
p p
pp
p
p
X N X
n Xdxn
N Xdn
n X
 ∂
− ∂ = − <
∂
+ −
∂
         (21) 
The social welfare function is represented as: ( )
0
( ) ( ), ,
pXp pW n P N X Z dZ nf= −∫  where 
( )( ), 1 ( )p pP N X Z Z N X= − +  and ( ) ( ).p pX n nx n=  
Thus, using the FOC of the social welfare function, we have the following socially second-best 
number of firms: #
0
( ) ( )2 0 .
pp p pXp pW n X N Xn n P dZ f
n n n
 ∂ ∂ ∂
∈ ≥ = + − = 
∂ ∂ ∂ 
∫  
Evaluating the FOC of the social welfare function at the number of firms under free entry, we 
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obtain: 
0
( )
( ) .
p
p p
p p p p Xp p p
p
P x f
p p p
p p p
p
W X N X XP dZ P x
n n X n
X N X XP x X
n X n
=
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
= + −
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
 ∂ ∂ ∂
= − + ∂ ∂ ∂ 
∫
                     (22) 
The first (second) term of equation (22) is a business-stealing (-augmenting) effect. Taking the 
FOC of profit maximization of individual firms, i.e., ,p pP x=  and the effects on the total and 
individual outputs, i.e., equation (21), equation (22) can be rewritten as: 
( )
( )2 1 ( )0.
1 ( )1
p p
p p p p
p p
p
P x f
p
p
p
p p
p
W x N X XX X
n n X n
X
N XnX
N X X
n X
=
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
= +
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
 ∂
= − > < ∂ ∂ + −
∂
                         (23) 
Thus, we obtain the following relationship: 
( ) 1( )0 ( ) .
2p p
p p
p
P x f
W N X
n X
=
∂ ∂
> < ⇔ > <
∂ ∂
                               (24) 
In the case of CINEs, if the degree of marginal network effects is larger (smaller) than a half, 
the number of firms under free entry is insufficient (excessive), based on the second-best criteria. 
For example, if we assume a linear network function, i.e., ( )e eN X Xβ=  and 0 1,β< <  it 
holds that 1( )0 ( ) .
2p p
p
P x f
W
n
β
=
∂
> < ⇔ > <
∂
 See Proposition 1 in Toshimitsu (2020). However, if 
assuming the case of CSNEs, the network effect elasticity of network size is unity, i.e., 
( ) 1,pXε =  and, in view of equation (11), the number of firms under free entry is socially 
excessive, irrespective of the degree of network effects. 
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Furthermore, with respect to the case of CINEs having responsive expectations, we can derive 
the same results as in Section 3.1, i.e., the socially excess entry arises, irrespective of the degree 
of network effects. 
 
3.3 Further problems 
(1) Network function 
We have respectively considered the cases of CSNEs and CINEs having passive expectations, 
based on a general form of network function. As a result, whether the number of firms under free 
entry is socially insufficient or excessive depends on the nature of the network function. However, 
if the network effect is a linear function of network size, socially excessive entry always arises in 
the case of CSNEs while socially insufficient entry can arise in the case of CINEs. Thus, we need 
to investigate the properties of the network function. 
Furthermore, assuming the cases of CSNEs and CINEs in a linear city market, we have 
derived the inverse demand function with multiplicative and additive network functions, 
respectively. Thus, we should consider the relationship between utility and network functions.3 
(2) Symmetric assumptions 
We have assumed heterogeneous consumers in a linear market, i.e., [0,1].θ ∈  This assumption 
is similar to that of Katz and Shapiro (1985). In this case, it may be natural to assume that 
consumers have different preferences regarding network effects and various expectations of 
network sizes. However, we assume a symmetric network function and the same expected 
network size, i.e., ( ) ( )e eN X N Xθ θ =  for [0,1],θ ∈  where e eX Xθ =  is the expected network 
                                                   
3 Swann (2002) considered the functional form of the relationship between utility and the size of 
a network and found that the functional form can be linear, but only under strong conditions. 
Furthermore, he explored the conditions under which an individual utility is a linear function of 
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size of consumer .θ  Relaxing this assumption, we should examine not only the excess entry 
theorem, but also the properties of a fulfilled Cournot oligopolistic equilibrium itself. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
We have reconsidered the excess entry theorem in the presence of network effect-sensitive 
consumers having passive expectations in a network product market, where a Cournot 
oligopolistic competition prevails. 
We have demonstrated as follows. In the case of passive expectations, the stronger is the 
strength of network effects, the larger is the business-augmenting effect over the business-stealing 
effect. Hence, the number of firms under free entry is socially insufficient. In other words, from 
the viewpoint of social welfare, a government should promote new entry to the market. With the 
responsive expectations, whether consumers are sensitive or insensitive to network effects, the 
number of firms under free entry is socially excessive. That is, taking into account that the 
expected network sizes of consumers are the same as the announced level of total outputs, firms 
thus perceive the inverse demand functions as well as the expected network sizes and determine 
their actual outputs. Thus, an increase in the number of firms promotes a negative 
business-stealing effect, but not a business-augmenting effect. In this case, a government should 
restrict the number of new entries. 
The results depend on the types of consumer expectations, i.e., passive or responsive. We 
need to explore both theoretically and empirically how consumers form network sizes and in 
which products and services markets this occurs. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
network size. This problem is the out of scope of this paper. 
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